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Placing the Colonial State in the 
Middle: The Comparative Method 
and the Study of Empires
Reo Matsuzaki
RESÜMEE
Reo	 Matsuzaki	 fragt	 in	 seinem	 Beitrag	 nach	 Umsetzungsmöglichkeiten	 der	 vergleichenden	
Kolonialismusforschung.	 Dabei	 basieren	 seine	 methodischen	 Überlegungen	 auf	 den	 Ergeb-
nissen	der	Fallstudien	des	vorliegenden	Bandes.	Er	schlägt	vor,	nicht	die	einzelnen	 Imperien	







In the study of empires, structured comparisons are rarely employed as a means of un-
derstanding variation in policy outcome. The reason lies in the very nature of the subject 
matter: Empires are vast and complex political systems comprised of sub-units that often 
have little in common. As a result, it is difficult to devise a method of measurement 
that can be used to systematically compare outcomes across the sub-units. For example, 
the pre-World War II Japanese Empire, small relative to the vast British and French 
empires, included the settler colonies of Hokkaido and Karafuto; the ‘leased’ territory 
in the southern portion of Liaodong Peninsula; the highly authoritarian and largely au-
tonomous government generals of Taiwan and Korea; the fully incorporated and semi-
colonial province of Okinawa; the League of Nations mandate of Nan’yo (South Sea); 
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and finally, the ostensibly sovereign puppet regime of Manchukuo. Given this diversity, 
how is one to evaluate the relative ‘successes’1 or ‘failures’ of Japanese colonial efforts in 
Taiwan versus Korea, let alone Okinawa versus Manchukuo? Conversely, how are we to 
compare the struggles of the colonized people against Japanese coercion?
In this concluding essay, I continue the methodological discussion begun by Heé and 
Schaper by drawing upon the contributing articles in this volume. My proposition comes 
in two parts. First, we should move away from empires as the primary units of analysis. 
Instead, the colonial state, as a corporate actor with its distinct set of interests, should 
be placed at the center of our investigations. By making this conceptual move, we can 
treat the diverse background conditions and histories of colonized territories, as well as 
national traditions and geostrategic concerns of imperial metropoles, as variables that 
determined the development of colonial systems. Second, our attempts to analytically 
compare empires can be bolstered by specifying the political arenas in which the colonial 
state participated, as well as by identifying the mechanisms that structured interactions 
between the colonial state and other key players within each arena. My aim is to discuss 
how we can generalize from the uniqueness of the individual cases, and explain variation 
in outcome by systematically comparing interactions between similar types of actors 
across vastly different colonial environments.
1. The Comparative Method and the Colonial State
The comparative method, unlike commonplace comparisons, employs explicit rules 
when selecting cases in order to ‘uncover’ causal relationships, which are then generalized 
across a population of cases. Therefore, the goal is not necessarily to highlight interesting 
similarities or differences in the cases examined, but rather, to use these similarities or 
differences to support one’s theoretical interpretation of the cases. The rules employed to 
select cases depend on the research question. Nonetheless, case selection criteria tend to 
conform to one of two methods developed by John Stuart Mill: the method of agreement 
or the method of difference.2 In the method of agreement, two very different cases (in 
terms of possible causal factors) with similar outcomes are selected for comparative study. 
The task of the investigator is to expose the common set of factors that produced similar 
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approach by comparing two similar cases with different outcomes. By holding many of 
the likely causal factors/variables ‘constant’, the researcher investigates the validity of his 
or her theoretical claims and hypotheses.3
The application of both the method of difference and the method of agreement (or any 
other comparative technique) begins by measuring variation in outcome of some politi-
cal phenomena. In the study of empires, this may be best accomplished by focusing on a 
colonial territory as the unit of analysis. After all, while colonies are exploited to advance 
the goals of metropolitan rulers, violence itself is perpetrated within the colonized socie-
ties. Resistance to oppression also takes place on the ground and in the localities, even if 
resistance involves external allies. Insofar as the outcomes we care about occur at the local 
level, measurement of variation should also be localized.
Although there are various outcomes (such as, degree of political racialization, extent 
of armed resistance, etc.) that could be measured and studied in comparative analy-
ses of colonial territories, the effectiveness of a colonial state in providing / imposing 
‘outputs’ serves as an analytically convenient starting point. In their study of political 
systems, Gabriel Almond and G. Bingham Powell argue that a functioning state engages 
in the following ‘output’ producing/imposing activities: (i) extraction of resources, such 
as money, goods, persons, or services; (ii) distribution of goods and services, such as 
education, health, sanitation, recreation, and safety; (iii) regulation of human behavior; 
and (iv) instillation of meaning and identity.4 The outcomes of some of these activities 
are more quantifiable than others. Nonetheless, even if it is difficult to attach a precise 
numerical value to all of a state’s ‘outputs’, by conceptualizing what an ideal-typical5 
state should be able to do, Almond and Powell provide a standard of evaluation that can 
be used to select and compare the performance of various political systems, including 
colonial states.
This is not to suggest that colonial states sought to provide/impose these ‘outputs’ in 
the same way or with the same intentions as modern nation-states. We find that many 
colonial states purposely limited the availability of educational opportunities to native 
inhabitants, for education helped unmask the injustices inherent to the colonial system. 
Colonial states also heavily taxed the colonized people, thereby intentionally destroying 
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when a colonial state provided / imposed the above ‘outputs’, it was for the purpose of 
deepening its domination.6
Nonetheless, every colonial state, to a lesser or greater degree, extracted resources, dis-
tributed goods and services (albeit in a highly discriminatory manner), regulated and 
disciplined the behavior of the colonized people, and sought legitimation of its rule 
by controlling discourse and symbols. Therefore, while we should not forget that co-
lonial states also engaged in other unambiguously destructive endeavors, by focusing on 
Almond and Powell’s ‘outputs’, it is possible to compare vastly different colonial systems. 
Moreover, the uniqueness of each colonial territory is not lost in such an analysis. The 
differences across colonial territories in terms of culture, history, and geography, as well 
as differences in the aims and goals of colonizers, become an integral part of explaining 
variation in the provision/imposition of ‘outputs’.
Unique background conditions, however, were not the only source of variation. The 
internal structure of the colonial state – which is seen here to be comprised of the various 
administrative, legislative, and judicial organizations within a specific colonial territory, 
as well as the individuals who staff these organizations – also varied across territorial 
units. As Max Weber argues, the most effective states were supported by efficient bu-
reaucracies.7 He writes: 
[T]he purely bureaucratic type of administrative organization […] is, from a purely 
technical point of view, capable of attaining the highest degree of efficiency and is in 
this sense formally the most rational known means of exercising authority over human 
beings. It is superior to any other form in precision, in stability, in the stringency of its 
discipline, and in its reliability.8 
Furthermore, efficiency is increased when the state is autonomous from society. Like oth-
er corporate actors, such as trade unions and businesses, successful states are those that 
can single-mindedly pursue well-defined agendas without distractions or interferences.9
Quite unlike the ideal-typical Weberian state, however, Joel Migdal finds that many 
colonial states were permeated by society. Overrun by the interests of local collabora-
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pursuing its own agenda.10 Meanwhile, lacking discipline and training, some colonial 
bureaucrats sought self-aggrandizement and sabotaged the colonial state’s efforts to pro-
vide/impose ‘outputs’. Moreover, even ‘honest’11 bureaucrats harbored personal interests 
and concerns that at times conflicted with their role as agents of the colonial state. There-
fore, although most colonial states excelled at extracting and exploiting resources, they 
were often unable to monitor and discipline the colonized people.12 Even in places such 
as the Philippines, where the American colonizers invested much time and money in an 
effort to construct a Weberian state, the colonial bureaucracy conformed more or less to 
this unflattering norm.13 The image of a typical colonial state that thus emerges is one of 
a highly coercive actor that nonetheless exhibited extreme weaknesses.
Several of the authors in this volume focus squarely on these intra-state dynamics that 
produced variation in the effectiveness of the colonial state (as a corporate actor). In his 
essay on the Soviet empire, Teichmann traces early Soviet state-building efforts in Cen-
tral Asia through the perspectives of three local administrators: Isaak Abramovich Zelenskii, 
Faizulla Khojaev, and Usman Iusupov. In their stories, we see how class and ethnic ten-
sions within the local administration disrupted the operation of the colonial state. For 
example, while Zelenskii was sent to Central Asia by Moscow to solve the problem of 
inter-ethnic animosity, he was unable to overcome his own prejudices against Central 
Asian Bolsheviks. Meanwhile, Khojaev and Iusupov, both originating from Central Asia, 
were sandwiched between their identity as Central Asian Bolsheviks and their role as 
executioners of Stalin’s ambitious nationality policies. They had to engage in a delicate 
balancing act, as they were easily suspected of treason both from above (Moscow) and 
from below. Indeed, Khojaev was purged in July 1937, partly due to his staunch insist-
ence that Central Asian Muslim communities could ‘reform’ themselves from within.
While Teichmann’s focus is largely on the interests and actions of specific colonial agents, 
Lindner draws our attention to the formal rules and structures of colonial bureaucracies, 
as well as to characteristics of the individuals who staffed these organizations. She notes 
that when German colonial expansion in Africa began quite suddenly and unexpectedly 
in the 1880s, a formal system for educating and training civilian colonial agents had not 
yet been devised; as a result, German colonial presence in Africa was maintained (par-
ticularly in the rural regions) through a network of military outposts. Meanwhile, the 
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administration was staffed by present and former officers of the colonial corps.14 Conse-
quentially, although violence was commonplace throughout colonized Africa, German 
colonial states were exceptionally feared for their brutality. For example, the German 
colony of Togo was popularly known as the ‘twenty-five country’, for even low-ranking 
colonial officials were authorized to dole out sentences of twenty-five lashes for natives 
without any court order.
The structure of indirect rule, which was the most prevalent form of colonial administra-
tion in Europe’s African colonies, also had an adverse effect on the cohesiveness of the 
colonial state. By bestowing upon native chiefs the power to distribute resources, collect 
revenue, and interpret customary laws, Europeans sought to create loyal allies in the 
localities. It was also a strategy born out of necessity, as Europeans were unable or unwill-
ing to invest significant resources and manpower into their African colonies.15 However, 
as Schaper displays, while this system allowed colonizers to govern over vast territories 
with minimal European presence, it also provided opportunities for African chiefs to 
pursue their own independent agenda. Ultimately, indirect rule blurred the boundaries 
between state and society, thereby weakening the colonial state’s identity as a unified 
corporate actor. As bureaucratic efficiency was lost, so too was the colonial state’s ability 
to provide/impose ‘outputs’.
Nonetheless, there were important exceptions to this general trend. In contrast to most 
other colonial states, Taiwan developed into a modern (and despotic) Weberian state. 
Highly autonomous and disciplined, Taiwanese colonial bureaucrats were able to build 
an extensive network of roads and rail, eradicate the plague, minimize the outbreak of 
cholera, rapidly expand educational opportunities, and create an export economy that 
turned Taiwan into a highly profitable colonial possession.16 In part, the Taiwan ‘excep-
tion’ can be explained by the single-minded obsession of Japanese policymakers to con-
struct legal-rational authority in Taiwan. By minimizing the political participation of the 
Taiwanese, and even that of the Japanese settler community, the Government General 
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higher than in the metropolitan bureaucracies, in order to attract competent Japanese 
administrators to Taiwan.17
However, analyses that focus exclusively on the internal composition of the colonial state 
tell, at best, only half the story. Whether a colonial state was able to provide/impose ‘out-
puts’ was also a function of the various interactions between the colonial state and other 
actors, both within and outside the colonial territory. It was indeed the case that the 
colonial state, irrespective of its cohesion or autonomy, was the dominant actor within a 
specific territory. Yet, even in the most unequal of relationships, the weaker player retains 
some ability to exert agency.18 Therefore, for a more complete analysis, we must look 
beyond the internal characteristics of the colonial state and examine the interactions 
between the colonial state and other key players in three distinct political arenas: inter-
national, home, and domestic. By ‘international’, I refer to the relationships between the 
colonial state and foreign policymakers, missionaries, businessmen, and representatives 
of international organizations. ‘Home’ refers to the colonial state’s interactions with the 
central government and bureaucracies, as well as with private individuals and organiza-
tions from the metropolitan region of the empire. Finally, ‘domestic’ is comprised of the 
intricate links between the colonial state and the colonized society.
At this point, my argument comes full circle. I began this concluding essay with a meth-
odological discussion: I argued that a focus on the colonial state would allow researchers 
to compare seemingly different colonial territories. Yet, methodology is not the only rea-
son why one might choose to focus on the colonial state, and its attempts to provide/im-
pose ‘outputs’. As the discussion of the three arenas displays, there are theoretical reasons 
as to why it may be advantageous to place the colonial state in the center of one’s analysis. 
The colonial state, with its distinct identity, agenda, and interests, lies in the middle of all 
interactions within, and concerning, the colonial polity.
However, the tendency in the literature has been to ignore (often unconsciously) the role 
of the colonial state as a distinct corporate actor. Similar to how Marxist scholars have 
often equated the interests of liberal-democratic governments to the interests of the capi-
talist classes, scholars of colonialism have had a tendency to assume that the interests of 
colonial states were the same as that of the imperialists in the home polity. The prevailing 
view in the literature is one where each empire possessed a distinct style of colonialism 
(derived from national traditions and / or geostrategic concerns), and any variation in 
outcome across colonial territories resulted from differences in the conditions found on 
the ground. The colonial state, as an actor, is analytically missing from this perspective. 
Instead, echoing Theda Skocpol and her collaborators’ proclamation that we must “bring 
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2. The Colonial State and the Three Arenas
The notion that the colonial state was a central actor which navigated within three sepa-
rate political arenas (foreign, home, and domestic) only serves as a starting point of a 
comparative analysis of empires. In order to explain variation in outcome, it is necessary 
to identify the precise causal mechanisms that systematically produced similarities or 
differences across the cases examined.20 By doing so, it is possible to generalize from the 
particularities of the individual cases and advance broader theoretical interpretations.21 
To illustrate this, I draw upon the findings of the contributing essays in this volume and 
highlight some of the causal mechanisms that similarly structured interactions within 
each of the three arenas.
International arena: The primary mechanism in the international arena was that of com-
petition. For example, one of the reasons why French policymakers in Indochina shifted 
their colonial policy from naked exploitation (cloaked in the language of ‘assimilation’) 
to that of colonial development (under the framework of ‘association’) was to guard 
against possible Japanese expansion into Southeast Asia.22 Meanwhile, lingering threats 
(both real and imagined) from Russia and China led the Korean Government General to 
adopt repressive assimilatory policies, especially before 1919 and after 1937. The Gov-
ernor General and his lieutenants reasoned that the only long-term solution to threats 
posed by the Chinese or the Russians was to forcefully transform Koreans into loyal 
subjects of the Japanese Emperor.23 Furthermore, assimilation policy became a critical 
component of an ideological campaign to win the hearts and minds of the Asian people. 
As the Japanese competed in a global struggle against other imperialist powers, they 
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However, as Heé argues, the Japanese were ultimately unable to reject Western colonial 
models, because the Japanese were themselves engaging in a ‘self-civilizing’ mission at 
home. Even if the Japanese sought to look within their own society for an alternative Asiatic 
model of colonialism, the problem was that the Meiji reformers were rapidly reconstitut-
ing Japan as a Western state.25 Ironically, their attempt to overcome and roll back West-
ern imperialism was hindered from the very fact that they accepted the superiority of 
Western models. Moreover, Japanese policymakers had much to gain by acknowledging 
the legitimacy of the Euro-centric imperialist system, for it provided them with the lan-
guage to justify their territorial claims over Korea and elsewhere. By arguing that Korea 
was a protectorate under Japanese jurisdiction, and by indicating that they were helping 
to shoulder the “white man’s burden”,26 Japanese imperialists convinced Western govern-
ments that their claims over Korea were legitimate.27
Furthermore, as the above examples suggest, imitation was also an important mechanism 
in the international arena. Indeed, as we see in the articles by Lindner, Schumacher, and 
Heé, colonial officials from different empires were in close communication. US Secretary 
of War Elihu Root (who was responsible for outlining America’s colonial policies in the 
Philippines and Puerto Rico), and Chief Civil Administrator of Taiwan Gotō Shinpei 
(who laid the foundations of the Japanese colonial system in Taiwan), were both known 
to have extensively studied British colonial models. Also, German Colonial Secretary 
Wilhelm Solf (1911–1918) was thoroughly impressed with the British administrative 
system in West Africa and maintained correspondence with Governor General of Nigeria 
Frederick Lugard (1914–1919). Moreover, imitation did not take place only between the 
new colonial powers (such as, Germany, Japan, and the United States) and the old (such 
as, France, Britain, and the Netherlands). French, Dutch, and British academics and 
colonial officials actively studied one another’s colonial policies and gathered in yearly 
conferences to exchange their ideas. In fact, it was through such interactions that French 
colonial officials began to adopt Britain’s model of ‘association’.28
Finally, administrators often traveled abroad to examine foreign colonial models firsthand. 
Mochiji Rokusaburō, Chief of Education Affairs in Taiwan (1903–1910), embarked on 
a journey across Southeast Asia in 1907 to learn about British, Dutch, and American co-
lonial education systems.29 Utsunomiya Tarō, Commander of the Chōsen (Korea) Army 
(1918–1920), had previously spent time in British India and Egypt, where he had a 
chance to study British infrastructures of control.30 Ōtsuka Tsunesaburō, Chief of Home 
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mission to Britain and Ireland. It was partly through this experience that Ōtsuka came 
to favor the creation of a legislative body in Korea, where Koreans could partake in the 
formulation of domestic policy.31
Home arena: An important mechanism that structured interactions in the home arena was 
inter-bureaucratic politics. When countries annexed foreign territories as colonial posses-
sions, it became necessary for the home government to devise a system of coordinating 
the policies of the various colonial administrations. Regardless of whether this was done 
through an existing bureaucratic organization or through the creation of a new colonial 
ministry, jurisdictional battles were unavoidable. After all, colonial policy was intricately 
linked to other areas of foreign and domestic policy.32 Furthermore, the colonial state 
itself was a powerful actor that could disrupt the balance of power between the metro-
politan ministries. The colonial state controlled vast human and natural resources that 
could be mobilized to pursue an independent agenda, or to advance the interests of some 
actor, be it the military or the foreign ministry.33
Moreover, given the diverging priorities of different bureaucratic organizations, the pre-
cise way by which these jurisdictional battles played out had important consequences on 
the long-term development of colonial territories. We see in Teichmann’s essay, for ex-
ample, that policymakers in Moscow sought to uniformly transplant Soviet institutions 
into Central Asia without taking into account the unique characteristics of this region. 
Had Central Asian Bolsheviks, such as Faizulla Khojaev, been given more autonomy in 
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Meanwhile, as Heé displays through her framework of the ‘double bind’, Japanese domes-
tic debates, and in particular, concerns over Japan’s international image, constrained the 
Taiwan Government General’s efforts to design and implement penal codes. When Gov-
ernor General Kodama Gentarō (1898–1906) officially reintroduced flogging in Taiwan, 
it was not without controversy, even within the Government General. Most significantly, 
Odate Koretaka (who was a member of the Taiwan Supreme Court) penned an internal 
memorandum criticizing the Governor General’s policy. He argued that reintroduction 
of flogging contradicted Japan’s stated goal of ‘civilizing’ Taiwan, and undermined the 
legitimacy of the Government General. Such objections took on importance, however, 
because they plugged into ongoing policy debates and power struggles within the home 
polity. A day after the reintroduction of flogging in January 1904, Yomiuri shinbun (a 
major Japanese daily) published a critique of Kodama’s policy, helping to mobilize Japa-
nese civil society against the colonial state in Taiwan. This in turn played into the ju-
risdictional battles by strengthening the hand of those who were already critical of the 
autonomy enjoyed by the Government General.34
Similarly, interventions by actors in the home polity are also significant to Schumacher’s 
account of why American policy in the Philippines moved away from the indirect rule 
model of the British to one reproducing American institutions. Inspired by British prac-
tices in the Malay Straits, American colonial officials had initially intended to govern the 
Muslim population of the islands of Sulu, Mindanao, and Palawan through native laws 
and local power structures. However, this plan was quickly abandoned after a coalition of 
church leaders, progressive reformers, abolitionists, and imperialists exerted considerable 
pressure on the U.S. government to change course. It was simply unacceptable to the 
American public that the ‘backward’ and ‘uncivilized’ sultans, who practiced polygamy 
and slavery, should be vested with so much authority.
Domestic arena: This arena differs from the other two in that a dense system of extractive, 
distributive, and disciplinary institutions35 regulated the interactions between the colo-
nial state and the colonized society. As such, relationships of domination and resistance 
in the domestic arena were much more structured compared to the fluid relationships in 
4	 For	the	official	record	of	the	various	exchanges	between	the	representatives	of	the	Taiwan	Government	General	
and	parliamentarians	in	the	Imperial	Diet,	see:	Gaimushō	jōyakukyoku	hōkika,	Taiwan	ni	shikō	subeki	hōrei	ni	
kansuru	 hōritsu	 (Rokujūsanhō,	 Sanjūichihō	 oyobi	 Hōsangō)	 no	 gijiroku	 [Diet	 Records	 of	 laws	 governing	 the	
ordinances	enforced	 in	Taiwan	 (Law	6,	Law	,	and	Law	)],	Tokyo	966.	See	also:	M.	Haruyama,	Kindai	Ni-
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the foreign and home arenas.36 However, the mere existence of formal institutions (such 
as health boards and school districts) did not guarantee that the target population would 
behave as the colonial state intended. For example, Schaper shows that German legal in-
stitutions in Cameroon, despite having clearly favored the interests of the white coloniz-
ers, were at times used by the Cameroonians to fight for their rights. The native society 
was indeed constrained by the institutions imposed upon them by the colonizers, but 
the colonized people still retained the ability to exercise agency. Moreover, opportunities 
to ‘indigenize’ colonial institutions varied depending on the structure of constraints gov-
erning state-society relations.37 Therefore, when evaluating the effectiveness of colonial 
institutions in perpetuating violence, or the ability of the colonized people in blunting 
domination, mechanisms of enforcement and compliance become a central issue.38
A focus on enforcement and compliance mechanisms also helps to explain variation 
in the provision/imposition of ‘outputs’ across colonial systems. Unlike their European 
competitors, the colonial states in Taiwan and the Philippines similarly sought to directly 
govern over their respective colonized societies by building an extensive bureaucratic 
infrastructure. Nonetheless, in order to extract resources and discipline the behavior of 
the colonized people, they were compelled to forge collaborative relationships with local 
elites. The method through which Japanese and American colonizers structured these 
relationships, however, varied significantly. On the one hand, American colonial poli-
cymakers sought to sever the traditional clientelistic ties between Filipino elites and the 
local communities. The American strategy was to advance ‘civilized’ forms of political 
participation by integrating Filipinos, as individuals, into the newly created political and 
bureaucratic institutions. However, by excluding traditional sources of authority from 
the formal structures of the colonial state, the Americans left space for local bosses to 
behave autonomously. Meanwhile, taking the opposite approach, the Japanese incor-
porated traditional Taiwanese power structures into their colonial administration at the 
local level. Ultimately, by fusing traditional and legal-rational authority, this method 
proved to be far more effective in establishing a system of domination.
Finally, although the task of unmasking causal mechanisms is simplified by focusing on a 
single political arena, variation in outcome across colonial territories may sometimes be 
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uting authors, Heé most clearly takes an institutional approach, as she investigates how 
systems of enforcement were structured in colonial Taiwan. Her analysis, however, does 
not remain within the bounds of the domestic arena. While Japanese colonial officials 
justified the reintroduction of flogging in Taiwan by arguing that it was the form of pun-
ishment most familiar to the Taiwanese, the way in which flogging was administered was 
distinctly Japanese. Both the ‘punishment plate’ that the prisoners were strapped onto, 
as well as the whips used to flog them, were Japanese modifications of mainland Chinese 
instruments. Moreover, these instruments were used in Japan itself during the early Meiji 
period, before the Japanese had adopted Western criminal codes.
3. Conclusion
In this essay, I have attempted to make a case for a colonial state-centric analysis of 
empires. I argued that different colonial territories could be systematically compared, if 
comparisons are structured around common sets of mechanisms that similarly regulated 
the behavior of actors across cases. However, I still have yet to discuss why we should 
compare different colonial territories in the first place. After all, the best works in the 
study of empires and colonial systems have been longitudinal analyses of single-case 
studies. By casting his or her net too widely, a researcher may be left with conclusions 
that are seemingly superficial. If so, why should we engage in comparative analyses in 
the first place? Is it not better for each scholar to study one case in depth, and leave it to 
editors of collected volumes to make the comparisons?
If two or more cases are compared simply to highlight interesting similarities or differen-
ces, then there is little gained, conceptually or theoretically, by engaging in comparisons 
within a single study. On the other hand, if comparisons are utilized as tools to explain 
causality, then there is an argument to be made for their use. The goal of comparative 
politics is not necessarily to reveal the richness of a case, but to formulate hypotheses re-
garding why some outcome resulted, given a multitude of possible alternative outcomes. 
Therefore, the purpose is similar to that of a counter-factual analysis. Structured com-
parisons allow us to imagine alternative realities by referencing actual cases.39
The comparative method remains underutilized in the study of empires and colonial 
systems, and for good reasons. However, insofar as a researcher seeks to understand why 
some outcome resulted rather than another, it may be a method worth trying.
9	 On	counterfactual	analysis	in	the	study	of	history,	see:	J.	Bulhof,	What	If?	Modality	and	History,	in:	History	and	
Theory,	8	(999)	2,	pp.	45-68;	M.	Bunzl,	Counterfactual	History:	A	User’s	Guide,	 in:	American	Historical	Re-
view,	09	(2004)	,	pp.	845-858.	For	a	discussion	of	counterfactuals	by	political	scientists,	see:	G.	Capoccia/R.	D.	
Kelmen,	The	Study	of	Critical	Junctures:	Theory,	Narrative,	and	Counterfactuals	in	Historical	Institutionalism,	in:	
World	Politics,	59	(2007)	,	pp.	4-69;	J.	D.	Fearon,	Counterfactuals	and	Hypothesis	Testing	in	Political	Science,	
in:	World	Politics,	4	(99)	2,	pp.	69-95;	R.	N.	Lebow,	What’s	So	Different	about	a	Counterfactual?,	in:	World	
Politics,	52	 (2000)	4,	pp.	550-585;	P.	Tetlock	/	A.	Belkin,	Counterfactual	Thought	Experiments	 in	World	Politics:	
Logical,	Methodological,	and	Psychological	Perspectives,	 in:	 id.	(eds.),	Counterfactual	Thought	Experiments	in	
World	Politics,	Princeton	996.
